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Through Twitter, diplomats can comment on world events in near-real time, narrate their state’s actions and justify state policies.

Although they are often described as antiquated and change resistant institutions, Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) have proven to be innovative, utilizing new digital technologies towards the obtainment of traditional diplomatic goals. Since 2008, MFAs have launched digital Embassies in virtual worlds, migrated to social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter (now X), created digital diplomacy departments tasked with training diplomats, employed big data and sentiment analysis to inform the policy formulation process and launched dedicated smartphone applications. In a recent study, published in Policy & Internet, Elad Segev and I sought to analyze Twitter networks of MFAs. Previous studies suggest that although MFAs operate numerous social media profiles, they are most active on Twitter. Through Twitter, diplomats can comment on world events in near-real time, narrate their state’s actions and justify state policies. Moreover, Twitter enables diplomats to interact with elite audiences including journalists, policy makers and other diplomatic institutions. Indeed, studies suggest that diplomatic institutions follow one another on Twitter and that diplomats view their peers’ Twitter profile as an important source of information. For instance, MFAs may follow peers to identify policy shifts, diplomatic priorities and state’s positions on events shaping the world.  Few studies to date have mapped MFA networks on Twitter or tried to examine which factors contribute to the popularity, or centrality of MFAs in a Twitter network of their peers. It is possible that Twitter networks of MFAs mirror offline networks of diplomacy. In such an instance, one might expect that world powers would attract the most peers on Twitter. Yet it is also possible that Twitter networks differ from offline networks and that MFAs from peripheral states may attract more peers than world powers. In our study, we strove to both map MFA networks on Twitter and identify factors that contribute to the network centrality of an MFA among a network of its peers. To do so, we analyzed the Twitter network…

Political agents utilize digital platforms as alternative venues to solidify their ideological stances, employing rhetorical tactics characterized by substantial emotional impact, disinformation content, and hate expressions against specific individuals or social groups.

The widespread use of social networking platforms has facilitated enhanced communication between users and significantly influenced public opinion due to the vast amount of information readily available. Often, this information is shared anonymously and with immediate effect. Political figures have capitalized on this opportunity to engage with their audience directly, circumventing traditional media outlets. Their objective is to garner the attention of their potential voters by expressing their political perspectives on prominent issues and leaving a lasting impression on public opinion. Like numerous other countries, Spain grapples with political polarization and heightened tensions among actors in the prevailing landscape. During the early 2010s, Spain witnessed a significant increase in politically extreme groups, such as Vox, contributing to heightened political polarization. Political agents utilize digital platforms as alternative venues to solidify their ideological stances, employing rhetorical tactics characterized by substantial emotional impact, disinformation content, and hate expressions against specific individuals or social groups. This approach perpetuates prejudices and stereotypes among message recipients by repeatedly employing denigrant language. This phenomenon happens in a fragmented multi-party system like Spain’s, which comprises an array of national, local, and regional actors, and where the traditional two-party system is losing influence, and such tactics have attained greater significance. Digital platforms have emerged as the primary mode of interaction, facilitated by the echo chamber effect and homophily between users who typically engage in such scenarios. In these situations, political actors applied unidirectional communication to their voters. A form of communication that can involve the dissemination of disinformation and hate speech as tools for their rhetoric. This blog entry is based on a research paper titled “Promotion of hate speech by Spanish political actors on Twitter”, recently published in Policy & Internet (P&I). The study examines the extent and nature of hate speech on Twitter, as expressed by the 16 political groups in Spain’s Congress in 2020. We recognize the limitations of the scope of the paper. However, it…

China is perhaps one of the most digitalized societies worldwide. Part of this sweep has been abetted by the rise of large Internet companies that offer key services for everyday social and economic life in the general population.

Digitalization has swept through the global economy worldwide. China is perhaps one of the most digitalized societies worldwide. Part of this sweep has been abetted by the rise of large Internet companies that offer key services for everyday social and economic life in the general population. Such services touch upon social networking sites to enable digital connectivity over geographical distances and time, payment infrastructure to facilitate digital transactions and money transfers, and new platforms to expand video game options and video communication (such as short videos). The prominence of these services has been lucrative for Internet companies.  But their success has also made them a ripe target for regulation. My latest work examined the latest policies that have emerged out of China in response to the growth of Internet companies. Internet companies in China have leveraged their rich balance sheets to acquire or purchase minority stakes in smaller companies deemed conducive to growth. The most salient of these purchases include Tencent’s acquisition of a minority stake in California-based Snapchat and Alibaba’s stake in Chinese streaming platform MangoTV. The two cases capture the growing lengths to which Internet companies would search for new investment targets and engines of growth. Companies were not only looking to acquire competitors, they were also looking to acquire firms beyond the Internet sector and even national borders. This volley of acquisition activity was one of the major legislative battlegrounds for China’s policy crackdown. New policies urged stringent reporting guidelines that covered Internet firm activities across national borders, curbed internal anti-competitive practices, and institutionalized new channels of oversight through a collaboration of government ministries. If balance sheets were the only thing companies needed to acquire without limit, we would see private interests totalize social and economic life, resulting in greater inequality and the recession of government powers (and public interests). These concerns aboutthe growing influence of Internet companies are a story that is not restricted to China.…

In his latest editorial for Policy and Internet, John Hartley argues that a whole-of-humanity effort to meet the challenges of the ‘digital information space’ is impossible, unless we draw from those who have experienced colonialism.

In November 2023, the OECD convened a conference in Paris to ‘identify effective policy responses to the urgent challenges’ member countries face in the ‘information space’. It warned: Today, less than a quarter of citizens say they trust their news media and a majority worry that journalists, governments and political leaders purposely mislead them. In this context, the instantaneous and global spread of information, targeted disinformation campaigns that deceive and confuse the public, and rapidly changing media markets pose a fundamental threat to democracies. As the OECD recognises, ‘a new governance model is needed to establish a whole-of-society approach to fight mis- and disinformation and preserve freedom of speech.’  However, as I argued in a Policy and Internet editorial, a whole-of-humanity effort to meet these challenges is impossible to achieve through incumbent political arrangements.  This quagmire is the result of the ‘information space’ of the Internet being riven by enmities and conflict. Purposeful opposition to this digital ‘New World’ is treated as criminal gangsterism. Anyone who is not one of ‘us’ must be one of ‘them’ – an enemy. As per Ronfeldt and Arquilla, there are plenty: China, Russia, Iran, Wikileaks, criminal cartels (hacking, fraud, ransom), along with religious and nationalist ‘terrorists’ (Palestinians, Kurds, or Kashmiri but not Israel, Türkiye, or India). Andreessen adds accelerationist activists for libertarian sovereignty, while Marwick and others include far-right populists and populism.  However, an additional challenge impedes on universally-inclusive efforts. Namely, the privileged status of OECD countries and their nations that is currently being challenged. According to Frydl, people in OECD countries like to think of themselves as affluent, advanced, and mostly white. However, I argue, as life becomes increasing digitalised, these very people are beginning to learn what it feels like to be messed around, their lives harmed and resources farmed by unaccountable external agents that owe no allegiance to anyone. That is, citizens in OECD countries are somewhat learning what colonialism is through challenges to sovereignty and security delivered via the digital ‘information…

With political advertising increasingly taking place online, the question of regulation is becoming inescapable. In their latest paper, published in Policy&Internet, Junyan Zhu explores the definition of online political advertising and identities key questions regulators must confront when devising effective frameworks.

The rapid surge of online political advertising in recent years has introduced a new dimension to election campaigns. Concerns have arisen regarding the potential consequences of this practice on democracy, including data privacy, voter manipulation, misinformation, and accountability issues. But what exactly is an online political advert? This kind of question is hard to answer, and indeed, reports show that 37 per cent of respondents in the 2021 Eurobarometer Survey couldn’t easily determine whether online content was a political advertisement or not. As of now, only a few platform companies, including Facebook and Google, have defined in their own terms what constitutes this form of content. To address the conceptual challenges faced by policymakers, in our latest paper, we conducted interviews with 19 experts from regulatory bodies, professional advertising associations, and civil society organisations engaged in discussions surrounding online political advertising in both the United Kingdom and the European Union. We delved into the policymakers’ perspectives, seeking to distil their understanding of what constitutes an “advert”, “online” platforms, and “political” content. Instead of crafting new definitions, we pinpointed these alternative factors and illustrated them through a sequence of decision trees. Specifically, our work led us to pose three questions that regulators need to confront: What does it mean for content to be considered an “advert”? When we inquired about the criteria for identifying an advert, a consistent key point that emerged was payment. The central idea revolves around whether payment is involved in content distribution or creation, and it also depends on the timing of the payment. Some interviewees also acknowledged the increasingly blurred boundaries between paid and unpaid content. There are organic ways of spreading material that don’t involve payment, such as an unpaid tweet. These differences matter as they suggest alternative criteria for determining what should or should not count as an advert. What does it mean for an advert to be “online”? This turned out to be the most challenging question…

The OpenAI employees had faith in Altman. They believed in his vision and they did not like that the board could dismiss him so easily. Is their upset justified? Did the board overstep its bounds? Or did it exercise a necessary check on power?

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The sudden removal of OpenAI CEO Sam Altman on Friday was met with shock and disapproval by the company’s employees. More than 90% signed a letter threatening to leave OpenAI if the board didn’t resign and reinstate Altman. The OpenAI employees had faith in Altman. They believed in his vision and they did not like that the board could dismiss him so easily. Is their upset justified? Did the board overstep its bounds? Or did it exercise a necessary check on power? https://twitter.com/satyanadella/status/1726509045803336122?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1726509045803336122%7Ctwgr%5E53a5ba6d82ed8a383027570f3ecdffc60d632db6%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Ftheconversation.com%2Fopenais-board-is-facing-backlash-for-firing-ceo-sam-altman-but-its-good-it-had-the-power-to-218154 Silicon Valley’s ‘genius founder’ mythology The idea of a “genius founder” lies at the heart of Silicon Valley culture. Steve Jobs, Elon Musk, Mark Zuckerberg, Sergey Brin and Larry Page are not known as privileged men who managed to build successful businesses through a combination of hard work, smart decision-making and luck. Rather, they are celebrated as geniuses, wunderkinds, perhaps even maniacs – but always brilliant. Men who accomplished feats no one else could, because of their innate genius. A captivating founder narrative has become almost a prerequisite for any tech startup in Silicon Valley. It makes a company easier to sell and also structures power within the organisation. Throughout human history, founder mythologies have been used to explain, justify and sustain hierarchies of power. From heroes to deities to founding fathers, the founder myth provides a way to understand the current distribution of power and to unite around a figurehead. What happened this week at OpenAI was a challenge to the natural order of things in Silicon Valley. What happened to Sam? It’s quite remarkable a superstar “genius founder” such as Sam Altman wasn’t safeguarded by a company structure that could prevent his ousting. Tech company founders often create intricate structures to entrench themselves in their companies. For instance, when Google restructured into Alphabet, it created three share classes: one with standard voting rights, another with ten times the voting rights for the founders, and a third class without voting rights, mainly…

The conference brought together leading local and international scholars and practitioners from the fields of communication, political and computational sciences and law.

The Policy & Internet Journal, housed at the School of Art, Communication and English, held its annual conference on the 28-29 of September in the Social Sciences Building of the University’s Camperdown campus.  With an Asia-Pacific focus, the event was themed around policy inclusion within the scope of digitalisation and new technologies. The conference brought together leading local and international scholars and practitioners from the fields of communication, political and computational sciences and law.  Editor Dr Joanne Gray with keynote speaker,Professor Johanna Weaver. “One of the most important items to emerge from the conference is the importance of integrating empirical research findings to inform good tech policy, or ‘good policy’, as it was referred to many times across the two days,” said Dr Jonathon Hutchinson, Editor-in-Chief of Policy & Internet. Notable speakers at the conference included Professor Johanna Weaver from the Australian National University in Canberra and Dr Justine Humphry from the University of Sydney.  Presenters showcased a wide-reaching scope of papers that tackled the all-important realms of governance, policy design, content moderation, and inclusion.  EIC, Dr Jonathon Hutchinsonchairing the e-Safety: Youth anddigital media policy panel. Panels included e-Safety: Youth and digital media policy, chaired by Dr Jonathon Hutchinson, with speakers from the e-Safety Commissioner — including Nikky Sloss, Manager of Children, Youth and Families — along with academics from the University of Sydney, Dr Justine Humphry and Dr Catherine Page-Jeffrey.  Professor Catharine Lumby chaired Digital Hostility, policy and Social Change, which explored online hostility and its origins. The panel included academics from the University of Melbourne and RMIT, Professor Rob Cover, Dr Jay Daniel Thompson, and Dr Jennifer Beckett.  The last panel of the two-day conference, chaired by Dr Joanne Gray, titled Chat GPT and Gender Bias in the Asia Pacific Region. The discussion focused on how algorithms reflect and perpetuate gender inequity, notably from the experiences of lead researcher Dr Aim Simpeng, who co-presented the initial findings with Dr Olga Boichek.  ‘With…

Together, scholars and policymakers will discuss current practices, alternative designs and the ‘unknowns’ that are required for inclusive internet governance.

Policy innovation for inclusive internet governance Location:Social Sciences Building (A02), Lecture Theatre 200, University of Sydney, Camperdown Campus Dates and time:28-29 September, 20238:30am – 4:30pm The Policy & Internet conference will bring together a range of international voices to demonstrate how varying approaches towards internet policy are established, embodied and engaged with by a variety of stakeholders. Together, scholars and policymakers will discuss current practices, alternative designs and the ‘unknowns’ that are required for inclusive internet governance. Conference program Register now Day One: 28 September 2023 Keynote Speaker:Professor Johanna Weaver Founding Director of the Tech Policy Design Centre at the Australian National University (ANU) A recovering diplomat, and reformed commercial litigator, Professor Weaver champions tech policy as a tool to shape technology for the long-term benefit of humanity. Prior to joining ANU, Professor Weaver completed her term as Australia’s independent expert and lead negotiator on cyber issues at the United Nations. Earlier she led the Cyber Affairs Branch at the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, working closely with Australia’s inaugural Ambassador for Cyber Affairs. Professor Weaver is a member of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Global Advisory Board on digital threats during conflict. Panels: e-Safety: Youth and digital media policy Chair: Dr Jonathon Hutchinson Chair of Discipline of Media and Communication at the University of Sydney He is a Chief Investigator on the Australian Research Council LIEF project ‘The International Digital Policy Observatory,’ and is also a Chief Investigator on the eSafety Commission Research project ‘Emerging online safety issues: co-creating social media education with young people.’ For 2023 and 2024, he holds the prestigious position of President of the Australian and New Zealand Communication Association and is the current Editor in Chief of the Policy & Internet Journal. His most recent book, Digital Intermediation: Unseen infrastructure for cultural production, is available through Routledge. Panellists Presenters: Inclusivity Chair: Professor John Hartley, A.M Research professor in the…

Today, internet policy must confront issues relating to embedded interests, monopoly power, geopolitics, colonisation, warfare, automation, the environment, misinformation, safety, security and more.

*Submissions for this event have closed. Please refer to the event page for further details* Policy innovation for inclusive internet governance  Location:Social Sciences Building (A02), Lecture Theatre 200, University of Sydney, Camperdown Campus Dates and time:28-29 September, 20238:30am – 4:30pm Call for papers The task of internet policy making has changed markedly over the past two decades. The ‘move fast, break things’ era—during which a central policy concern was how to manage economic disruption across industry sectors from entertainment to journalism, retail, transport and hospitality—has evolved into a digital era characterised by complex and interconnected social, political and economic global challenges. Today, internet policy must confront issues relating to embedded interests, monopoly power, geopolitics, colonisation, warfare, automation, the environment, misinformation, safety, security and more. As DeNardis (2014) has argued, conflicts within internet governance involve critical negotiations over economic and political power and how these conflicts are resolved “will determine some of the most important public interest issues of our time”.  In seeking to resolve these conflicts, there is a risk that the dominant economic and geopolitical actors will structure outcomes in their interest. An inclusive approach to internet governance is needed if we are to achieve an equitable distribution of digital resources and opportunities. Inclusive internet governance requires that the voices, interests and values of the maginalised are included in policy making processes, so that dominant ideologies can be challenged and alternative imaginaries realised (Gurumurthy & Chami, 2016).  Novelty and innovation in internet policy is itself challenging. Typically, policy making is driven by past experiences (Schot and Steinmueller, 2018) and constrained by institutional formalities, hierarchies and procedures (Bauer, 2014). Innovation, on the other hand, requires space for exploration and experimentation with opportunities “only partially known” (Bauer & Bohlin, 2022). How does policy innovation occur?  This conference seeks to bring together a range of international voices to demonstrate how varying approaches towards internet policy are established, embodied and engaged with by…

Within our current online and hyper-connected lives, is it possible to have such a thing as global internet policy?

Black fractured stone

*Submissions for this event have closed. Please refer to the event page for further details* Datafication. Platformisation. Metaverse. Global Internet Policy or a Fractured Communication Future? Special Issue Call for Papers, Volume 15, Issue 4 Datafication. Platformisation. Metaverse. What is the state of global internet policy? Within our current online and hyper-connected lives, is it possible to have such a thing as global internet policy? Building off the 2022 Policy & Internet Conference, this special issue addresses the complex and multiple perspectives of internet policy from around the globe. As we evolve through the Anthropocene and attempt to navigate the significant challenges humanity currently faces, we are consistently reminded of the most pressing critical issues of our epoch. Economic systems are the point of breaking, industrial action mobilised by unions is at an all-time high, inflation is rising, workers’ pay continues to fall, and the stability of our political systems has come into question. Our health systems are under unfathomable stress, refugee numbers are increasing through displacement, and the war in Ukraine continues, all of which adds to the growing global societal, economic and political pressures. And yet, concurrently, our connectivity through digital media and its surrounding environments is at an all-time high, arguably from the rise of technology players providing suites of social media platforms and its supporting infrastructures that enable a seamless and convenient, always-on lifestyle. The same app that enables us to chat with our friends and family can also book our rideshares, order our food, pay for our purchases and tempt us to become internet celebrities. What was once framed as user generated content activity has now become a normalised cultural pastime, as TikTok influencers feed the demotic turn that sees ordinary folk become internet superstars in rather small timeframes. At the same time, policymakers are reforming legislation to address the incomprehensible imbalance of power that is generated by technology giants. One of the immediate issues…